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Contemporary trends in philosophy of mind have galvanized non-reductive 
physicalism, the thesis that (1) the world and its components are essentially physical, 
and (2) entities cannot be reduced to their fundamental physical parts. Reality is 
comprised of layers, each one metaphysically affixed to its neighbors while still 
retaining its own unique ontological status. Higher-level phenomena are thought to be 
dependent on, but not reducible to, lower-level occurrences. A levels-ontology 
ostensibly solves the problems bequeathed by a Cartesian worldview as well as those 
that come with strict physicalism. But ultimately we face the same questions that 
plague these views. How can disparate substances interact? How does the physical 
cause the mental, and vice versa? Moreover, can purportedly higher-level phenomena, 
such as beliefs, cause lower-level phenomena, such as neural reactions, as well as other 
higher-level phenomena, for instance other beliefs? Non-reductive physicalism 
precludes any causal junction between these realms whereby they produce effects in 
one other. “Non-reductive physicalism,” Jaegwon Kim says, “like Cartesianism, 
founders on the rocks of mental causation.”1 
 
John Heil addresses these questions in From an Ontological Point of View.2 It is 
evident in this text that an adequate theory of causality, particularly of mental 
causation, must stem from an adequate theory of properties, something current non-
reductionist theories overlook. In proposing a revisionary ontology of properties, Heil 
offers a promising account of causality and also avoids the problem of causal 
overdetermination, the premise that an event cannot have more than one sufficient 
cause. 
 
In this paper I draw on emergentism, a prevalent non-reductionist theory, in order to 
present the problem of causal overdetermination in philosophy of mind.  I attempt to  
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show that Heil’s theory illuminates the issue of causal overdetermination by virtue of 
its ontological seriousness. By applying Heil’s insights about the nature of properties, it 
becomes manifest that the requirement of a one-to-one relation between cause and 
effect is unwarranted. Therefore, causal overdetermination is fangless. 
 
I.  Non-Reductive Physicalism 
 
Non-reductive physicalists in philosophy of mind hold that the mind is essentially 
physical. Because of its complexity, however, the mind is said to comprise various 
levels. Physical phenomena constitute the lower levels and so-called mental phenomena 
constitute higher levels. Higher-level properties are dependent upon but irreducible to, 
and for this reason ontologically distinct from, lower-level properties. Though being in 
pain involves a series of underlying physical activities, “being in pain” is something 
over and beyond them.3
 
 
Emergentism is a prevalent non-reductive physicalist theory and is helpful to my 
discussion of the problems non-reductive physicalism encounters vis-à-vis causation. 
On this account, mental properties are emergent properties, i.e., they are ontologically 
distinct, higher-level properties that emerge from complex physical systems. Mental 
phenomena, then, are the result of exceptionally complex brains which give rise to 
conscious experience. Jaegwon Kim explains: 
 
[T]he intuitive idea of an emergent property stems from the thought that a 
purely physical system, composed exclusively of bits of matter, when it 
reaches a certain degree of complexity in its structural organization, can 
begin to exhibit genuinely novel properties not possessed by its simpler 
constituents.4
 
 
Beliefs, desires, intentionality, and emotional affect, then, allegedly emerge from 
neuronal substrata. Moreover, all mental phenomena are determined by configurations 
of neural events, such that “if the very same configuration of physiological events were 
to recur, the same mental phenomenon…would emerge again”.5 The relationship 
between mental properties and their physical underpinnings, then, is one of 
necessitation. However, though emergent properties are dependent upon their lower-
level properties, they are irreducible and thus cannot be explained in terms of physical 
properties.6
 
 
The irreducibility of emergent properties problematizes mental causation. All 
properties, physical and mental alike, have causal powers, for properties that do not 
contribute causally to their possessors contribute nothing at all. Therefore, just as they 
are ontologically irreducible, emergent properties have distinctive causal powers 
irreducible to the causal powers of their basal properties.7 To account for this, 
emergentists invoke causal laws. The ordinary laws of nature account for lower-level 
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physical events. The law of gravity, for instance, assures that objects within our 
physical universe fall at an average rate of 9.8 m/s2. But we can go further by positing 
additional laws that govern higher-level events (such as mental events on the 
emergentist account). These laws are neither reducible to nor derivable from the laws of 
nature (32). 
 
Causally efficacious mental properties and a subsequent theory of level-specific laws 
lead to the alleged charge of causal overdetermination, the premise that no event can 
have more than one sufficient cause. Say that the physical state of dehydration, P1, 
causes my putative mental desire for water, M1. My desire for water then causes my 
intention to go to the refrigerator, M2. But M2 is caused by its own underlying physical 
phenomenon, P2. Now M2 has two sufficient causes, M1 and P2, and thus is causally 
overdetermined.8
 
 
Though emergentism has merit regarding various technical problems in philosophy of 
mind, it fails with regard to mental causation. This pitfall is symptomatic of a deeper 
problem in all non-reductive physicalist theories. Their flawed notions of causation 
stem from mistaken concepts of the nature of properties. Despite an ostensible 
departure from Cartesian dualism, emergentism nonetheless maintains a distinction 
between the mental and the physical by an implicit allegiance to a levels ontology. On 
this view, reality comprises various levels, each ontologically distinct from and thus 
irreducible to one another, yet all of them dependent on their neighboring levels. Prima 
facie, it is an appealing theory, as it allows us to differentiate between ostensibly 
dissimilar properties such as having a belief and being an axon terminal. Inevitably, 
however, all theories that are anchored in this belief face problems regarding causation. 
They splinter the world into categories and cannot reassemble the theoretical pieces. 
Therefore we need a new ontology, one that restores cohesion among properties. 
 
II.  Heil’s Ontology of Properties 
 
In From an Ontological Point of View, John Heil proposes that properties are intrinsic 
powers or dispositionalities.9
 
 Properties are not aspects or parts of an object, but ways 
objects are. Put differently, they make objects the way they are by virtue of their 
standing in relation to one another at certain points of time. Objects are property-
bearers, but not bundles of properties. A shirt, for instance, is not merely a bundle of 
threads. Rather, it occurs from the distinctive relation that the threads bear to one 
another during a given stretch of time of which the threads dispose the shirt to be a 
certain size and shape, the color red, and appealing to its wearer. 
To be real, Heil says, is to possess causal powers (97). Properties are certainly not 
exempt from this dictum. A causally inert property would seem to make no difference 
at all to its possessor (77). The distinctive feature of properties, then, is their inherent 
capacity, or power, to dispose their possessors to behave in certain ways or to cause 
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certain effects in conscious observers. They make distinctive causal contributions to 
their possessors (76). Properties are not, however, pure powers, that is, exclusively 
dispositional. When we speak of properties, we must also speak of their qualitativity. 
Qualitativity refers to the intrinsic, categorical qualities an object possesses, such as 
color or shape. Dispositionality and qualitativity, then, are the two characterizing facets 
of properties. 
 
The distinction between these facets, though, goes no further than characterization. 
They are not ontologically distinct. In fact, Heil regards a property’s dispositionality 
and qualitativity as one and the same: qualities are dispositional and dispositions are 
qualitative. For instance, a baseball’s sphericity is both an inherent quality of a baseball 
and a disposition to roll. 
 
It is in divorcing dispositionality and qualitativity that theories of properties, and 
ultimately theories of mind, founder. Allowing this fundamental distinction 
countenances a world of levels in which dispositionality is thought to be grounded in or 
supervenient on non-dispositional, categorical (qualitative) properties. But by virtue of 
what does supervenience occur? Though we can separate dispositionality and 
qualitativity for explanatory purposes, levels of explanation do not then translate to 
levels of reality without ensuing metaphysical issues. If there were indeed ontologically 
distinct levels of reality, then there could be no interaction among the levels. It follows, 
then, that there is one level of reality, and it is to this level that properties and objects 
and conscious agents belong.10
 
 
Most theorists subjugate the behavior of properties to the authority of unconditional 
laws of nature. The instantiation of properties and their subsequent behavior is 
contingent upon the presence of these laws.11
 
 Heil, however, inverts this relationship. 
All laws, he says, are themselves grounded in powers possessed by objects. Laws 
govern the behavior of objects, namely, they cause them to act in certain ways under 
certain conditions. Laws, then, contribute to the causal powers of their possessors by 
virtue of their mediating between the properties themselves and the effects that 
properties have. Thus, on Heil’s view, causality is grounded in laws, which in turn are 
grounded in the dispositions of objects (36). 
Causation is not a numinous interaction between ontologically distinct levels, as 
property dualists and emergentists maintain, nor is it a bridge between the levels, as 
functionalists contend. Rather, it is grounded in an object’s properties qua powers qua 
qualities. By virtue of possessing certain properties standing in relation to one another, 
objects are disposed to behave in certain ways or to effect certain experiences in 
conscious observers. 
 
With this more robust account of properties, we can better address mental causation. 
Properties are intrinsic dispositionalities/qualities of objects, i.e. particularized ways 
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objects are. Mental and physical properties vis-à-vis conscious agents are intrinsic 
powers that make distinctive causal contributions to their possessors. But just as Heil 
contends that distinctions between dispositionality and qualitativity are for the purpose 
of characterization only, and are not ontological divisions, I propose that distinctions 
between the physical and the mental serve similar purposes. Talk of physical properties 
and mental properties is a conceptual tool by which we characterize the world and 
experience. 
 
Although such compartmentalization is useful for explanatory purposes, our conceptual 
and linguistic distinctions should not lead us to conceive of reality as myriad levels 
threaded together by a mysterious metaphysical stitching. There are not mental 
properties and physical properties, but only properties: qualitative/dispositional powers. 
Having height, mass, organs, nervous systems, consciousness, and beliefs are all ways 
familiar sorts of conscious beings are. These ways make distinctive causal contributions 
to their possessors. Having a certain mass disposes me to make footprints in mud. 
Having a highly complex nervous system disposes me to be conscious. Having beliefs 
about closet-monsters disposes me to demonstrate fearful behavior. For conscious 
agents in particular, brains have intricate neurophysiologic structures which dispose 
their hosts to behave in particular ways and to have experiences. 
 
It is important to note that this view escapes the threat of reductionism, the theory that 
complex entities such as consciousness can be reduced to their constitutive parts 
(typically neurons and microphysical reactions in the brain, vis-à-vis consciousness). 
Reductionist tendencies reveal yet another linguistic mirage conceived of by modern 
philosophers. Heil locates our widespread tendency to interpret language literally in an 
implicit devotion to the Picture Theory of Meaning, or the idea that the character of 
reality can be ascertained from our linguistic representations of reality (6). This 
generates the notion that each predicate literally corresponds to the property it 
represents. The Picture Theory presupposes a one-to-one relation between predicates 
and their corresponding referents, therefore endorsing such a view would lead us to 
think that “being in pain” or “having a belief” refers to discrete neurophysiologic 
properties. 
 
Instead of a one-to-one correspondence, Heil argues for imperfect similarity. Pains and 
beliefs manifest similarly enough among conscious beings and even across species to 
warrant use of the term “pain” or “belief”, but do so without being perfectly similar. 
Thus our predicates, attempting imperfectly to classify imperfectly similar events, 
designate what may seem to be one occurrence or one entity, such as being in pain, but 
what is in fact a multiplicity. Heil’s view, therefore, is not reductionism because Heil 
makes no move to reduce predicates to particular properties, or properties to particular 
neural configurations. A predicate denotes various kinds of properties, or even various 
combinations of properties. Likewise, a property need not refer to one particular entity. 
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III.  Heil and Mental Causation 
 
Through non-reductive physicalism in general and emergentism in particular, I have 
presented a common problem of mental causation, viz. causal overdetermination. The 
true test of Heil’s ontology, then, is its ability to withstand this issue. 
 
In the case of effect E having two or more sufficient and distinct causes X and Y, E is 
overdetermined.12 If my desire for water, M1, causes an intention to go to the 
refrigerator, M2, and my intention is caused by its own physical groundwork, P2, then 
the intention is overdetermined: M1 and P2 are each sufficient to cause M2. Put another 
way, “independent overdeterminers can ‘come apart’ – that is, either one of those 
causes could occur without the other”.13
 
 
Applying Heil’s insights about the nature of imperfect similarity, this assertion is 
inaccurate. M1 and P2 cannot in fact come apart because they are not in fact separate 
causes. Recall Heil’s contention that there is not a one-to-one relation between 
predicates and properties, though language misleads us into thinking that this is so. 
Neither, I argue, does there exist a one-to-one relation between dispositions and effects, 
that is, between properties and the ways in which they manifest. Saying that “M1 causes 
M2” singles out a particular causal relationship is symptomatic of the mistaken theory 
of properties that Heil warns about (one which assumes that the properties we name 
pick out particular entities in reality). Instead, properties are ways standing in relation 
to one another. This does not imply that ways are particular entities or particular 
manifestations. For instance, if I note that the Macintosh apple in my hand is red, the 
predicate “red” does not identify a universal property. The red of the apple is different 
from the red of a cardinal, yet I can correctly say that both are red. 
 
What bearing does this have on causal overdetermination? The absence of a one-to-one 
relationship between particular properties and particular manifestations would also 
mean the absence of one-to-one relationships between causes and effects. This would 
mean no sufficient conditions. Just as no single property entails a particular 
manifestation, no single condition entails a particular event. Instead there can be several 
necessary conditions (conditions in whose absence an event E cannot occur) that 
together comprise the sufficient condition (the condition in whose presence the event E 
must occur).14
 
 Our language would lead us to believe that what we refer to as a 
sufficient cause is indeed one cause, when in fact there are likely several causes, 
conditions, properties, or events standing in relation to one another that make degrees 
of contributions, some more or less important than others (remote or proximate causes, 
for instance). 
Consider a car accident. At first glance, it may seem that the Volvo that veered out of 
its lane was the singular cause for my crashing into the guard rail. But in fact, this ill-
fated vehicle was merely the proximate cause. If Volvo’s driver had gotten a reasonable 
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amount of sleep the previous night and so had not fallen asleep at the wheel; if I had not 
averted my eyes to speak to my passenger; if recent rainfall had not slicked the roads; 
then the event of hitting the guard rail could have been prevented. Yet the combination 
of these multiple necessary causes in fact led to catastrophe. 
 
Without a levels ontology, overdetermination among the physical and the mental does 
not occur because both “physical” and “mental” refer to the same level of reality. 
Moreover, even without levels, there may be no single sufficient cause for any given 
event, but rather several necessary causes, some remote and others proximate. What we 
call property X does not refer to the same entity in every instance. We perceive 
imperfectly similar manifestations of various ways objects are (viz. properties), and we 
apply our limited vocabulary and conceptual repertoire in an attempt to categorize what 
we perceive. The redness of an apple is not the same redness of the apple two days 
later, and neither of these is the same redness of a fire truck. The tendency to 
oversimplify the associations between predicate and property, and between property 
and manifestation, likewise translates to the associations we make between cause and 
effect. By naming a sufficient cause X for a given effect Y, we identify X as the causal 
partner of Y. But X may in fact refer to various necessary causes, standing in relation to 
each other at particular times, all of which yield Y. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
The paucity of adequate theories of mental causation portrays causation as a mysterious 
force in the workings of the mind. It seems that immaterial entities, such as mental 
phenomena, can have no impact on their physical foundations, or vice versa, given the 
absolute disparity between the two. This comes from an erroneous levels theory that 
grants the theoretical physical/mental division too much ontological clout. Following 
Heil, viewing causality as grounded in laws, and laws as grounded in the powers or 
properties of objects, eliminates causation’s shadowy overtones. A view such as Heil’s 
eradicates the metaphysical bifurcation between the physical and the mental and instead 
espouses a physicalist view of properties as qualitative/dispositional ways that objects 
are. The imperfect similarity of these ways allows for plurality among properties, rather 
than an absolute correspondence between a particular property and its manifestation. 
Similarly, the lack of a one-to-one relationship between predicates and properties, or 
particular properties and particular manifestations, leads to the lack of one-to-one 
relationships between causes and effects. We need not fear, then, that having multiple 
causes “overdetermines” an effect since “cause” does not pick out one thing in 
particular. Rather, “cause” refers to the dispositions of the entity which possesses the 
properties in question. 
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